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Does Payton Apply?: Absent Consent or Exigent
Circumstance, Are Warrantless, In-Home Police
Seizures and Arrests of Persons Seen Through an
Open Door of the Home Legal?
Jennifer Marind
The police do not need a warrant to arrest someone who is in
a public place if the police have probable cause for the arrest.'
With few exceptions,2 however, the police need a warrant to ar-
rest a person inside of his home.3 These exceptions are called
exigent circumstances and include instances where the police are
in hot pursuit of a suspect4 or where the police have probable
cause5 to think that the suspect will destroy evidence.6 Addition-
ally, it is possible for a person to be in his home but also suffi-
ciently in a public place to allow the police to arrest him, such as
when a suspect is straddling the open threshold of his home.7
What remains in question is whether the police may arrest
someone without a warrant when he is inside of his home but
I B.A. 1991, Lehigh University; M.A. 1993, University of Delaware; J.D. Candidate
2006, University of Chicago.
1 United States v Watson, 423 US 411, 423-24 (1976) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of a warrantless public arrest for a felony); Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318,
340 (2001) (upholding a warrantless public arrest for a misdemeanor).
2 United States v United States District Court, 407 US 297, 318 (1972) (noting that
the exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated").
3 Payton vNew York, 445 US 573, 583-90 (1980) (establishing that the police need a
warrant to arrest someone in his home, absent exigent circumstances). See also Steagald
v United States, 451 US 204, 205--06 (1981) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances
or consent, the police need a search warrant to arrest someone in the home of a third
party).
4 Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the police do not have
to delay an investigation and pursuit of a suspect where the delay could put the police or
third parties in danger). See also United States v Santana, 427 US 38, 42 (1976) (stating
that the suspect's retreat into her home could not "thwart" an otherwise proper arrest).
5 See Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 100-01 (1990) (suggesting that, absent hot
pursuit, probable cause of exigent circumstances is necessary).
6 See Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740, 749-50 (1984) (discussing situations that are
recognized as exigent circumstances, such as when there is a threat that evidence will be
destroyed).
7 Santana, 427 US at 40 (describing the suspect as standing "in the doorway" of her
home).
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visible to the police and the public because of an open door. Su-
preme Court precedents do not resolve this issue definitively and
the circuits differ in their answers to the question.'
Section I of this Comment reviews relevant Fourth Amend-
ment doctrines-including the expectation of privacy and the
plain view doctrines-and the Supreme Court decisions that pre-
clude warrantless arrests in the home absent exigent circum-
stances. Section II explores the circuit split by analyzing cases
from four different circuits: the Ninth, Second, Sixth, and Sev-
enth Circuits. Finally, in Section III, this Comment discusses
possible solutions to the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment
precludes the police from making warrantless arrests of indi-
viduals who are inside their homes, but visible through an open
door.9 This Comment suggests that warrantless in-home arrests
are presumptively unconstitutional, even if the police do not
physically enter the home, but that the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances or consent can overcome that presumption.
I. ARREST WARRANTS
This Section briefly reviews several Fourth Amendment doc-
trines that are relevant to plain view doorway arrests. This Sec-
tion then discusses three Supreme Court cases that form the
framework of the circuit split: United States v Watson,'° United
States v Santana," and United States v Payton.2 These cases
8 Compare United States v Morgan, 743 F2d 1158 (6th Cir 1984) (holding that ab-
sent exigent circumstances, police may not enter the home to make an arrest without a
warrant) with United States v Vaneaton, 49 F3d 1423 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that when a
defendant voluntarily exposes himself to the public view, the presumption against the
unreasonableness of a warrantless seizure in the home is overcome); United States v
Gon 230 F3d 44 (2d Cir 2000) (stating that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
was not implicated when the apartment door was voluntarily opened in response to a
knock). Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that such an arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment. Hadley v Williams, 368 F3d 747 (7th Cir 2004).
9 This Comment does not analyze "doorway" arrests. A "doorway" arrest occurs when
the police seize and arrest a suspect at the threshold of his home, though they do not
possess a warrant. See Santana, 427 US at 42 (reasoning that a person standing in the
open threshold of her home was in a public place); United States v Carrion, 809 F2d 1120,
1128 (5th Cir 1987) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy at the open door of a hotel room). See also Jack E. Call, The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Doorway Arrests, 19 Miss Coll L Rev 333, 344 (1999) (listing a table of cases
involving warrantless doorway arrests); Bryan Murray, After United States v Vaneaton,
Does Payton v New York Prevent Police from Making Routine Arrests Inside the Home,
Golden St U L Rev 135 (1996). This Comment takes that scenario a step further. If the
suspect is not in the open doorway, but is inside his home and is in the plain view of the
police, can the police seize and arrest him?
'0 423 US 411 (1976).
" 427 US 38 (1976).
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leave open the question this Comment seeks to answer: whether
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant when a police officer
arrests someone in his home, absent exigent circumstances or
consent, when the officer sees him through an open door.
A. Fourth Amendment Doctrines
The Fourth Amendment establishes that warrants must be
based on probable cause. 3 The Fourth Amendment does not,
however, explicitly state when warrants are required, though the
Supreme Court has "expressed a strong preference for war-
rants." + 'The warrant requirement protects individuals from un-
reasonable arrests and searches that may result from overzeal-
ous police officers. 5 A warrant indicates that a magistrate-a
neutral third party'-has confirmed that there is probable cause
for the arrest of a suspect. 7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement. For example, a warrant is not re-
quired for a public felony arrest based on probable cause, as dis-
cussed below. 8 One search warrant exception is the plain view
doctrine.' 9 The plain view doctrine can extend the scope of a war-
rant; it expands what an officer may seize when he is lawfully
searching for evidence or contraband.20 Under this doctrine, an
officer may seize a tangible item that is in plain sight, though the
item is not explicitly listed in a warrant, because the item is
12 445 US 573 (1980).
13 US Const Amend IV ("[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.").
14 United States vLeon, 468 US 897, 914 (1984).
1" United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1, 9 (1997) (stating that a warrant based on
probable cause is a "more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime'") (citation omitted).
16 Compare Shadwick v City of Tampa, 407 US 345, 349-52 (1972) (upholding a law
allowing a municipal clerk to issue arrest warrants because the clerk was a neutral party)
with Lo-Ji Sales, Inc v New York, 442 US 319, 326-27 (1979) (holding that a town justice
did not "manifest the neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer" when he
helped to execute a warrant).
17 Probable cause means that there is a factual basis to believe that the person being
arrested committed the crime. Consider Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 233-35 (1983) (dis-
cussing ways to evaluate and establish probable cause).
18 Watson, 423 US at 423-24.
19 Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 465 (1971) (reviewing the plain view
doctrine where the police have a warrant to search and "in the course of the search come
across some other article of incriminating character").
20 Id.
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within an officer's view and it is immediately apparent that the
item is evidence of a crime or is contraband.2 It is notable that
the Court has not yet applied this doctrine to arrests-that is,
the seizure of people. Additionally, there is a distinction between
a warrantless, plain view seizure in a public place and a seizure
on private property.22 Plain view seizures on private property are
more constricted than those made in a public place.
Another exception to the warrant requirement occurs when
the situation involves exigent circumstances.23 The Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized the hot pursuit of a fleeing
felon, 24 the threat of evidence destruction,25 and the threat of vio-
lence to the public or the police as situations constituting exigent
circumstances.26 The Court has not provided a definitive list of
factors that render a situation as one constituting exigent cir-
cumstances. Still, although the state must show that exigent cir-
cumstances existed (that the police had probable cause to believe
that exigent circumstances existed), 7 the doctrine recognizes
that police officers need latitude in responding to "swiftly devel-
oping situation[s].
The Fourth Amendment explicitly states that people have a
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects" from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.29 Per Katz v United States,30
the test to ascertain whether someone has a privacy expectation
21 See Horton v California, 496 US 128, 136-37 (1990) (holding that any evidence in
plain view can be seized where it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item is
connected to a crime).
22 See Payton, 445 US at 587, citing G.M Leasing Corp v United States, 429 US 338,
354 (1977) ("It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or
seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a
warrantless seizure of property ... situated on private premises to which access is not
otherwise available for the seizing officer.").
23 Payton, 445 US at 583.
24 Santana, 427 US at 42-43.
25 Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740, 749-50 (1984).
26 Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the police do not have
to delay an investigation and pursuit of a suspect where the delay could put the police or
third parties in danger).
27 Vale v Louisiana, 399 US 30, 34 (1971) (stating that "[tihe burden rests on the
[s]tate to show the existence of such an exceptional situation"). See, for example, United
States vHalley, 841 F Supp 137, 139 (M D Pa 1993) (declaring that the state must "estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that its entry into [a] defendant's apartment was
justified by such circumstances"); United States v Samet 794 F Supp 178, 180 (E D Va
1992) (noting that "[wiarrants are not required in cases in which the prosecution can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . exigent circumstances justified the war-
rantless entry").
28 United States vSharpe, 470 US 675, 686 (1985).
29 US Const Amend IV.
30 389 US 347 (1967).
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that the Fourth Amendment protects is whether the individual
has an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reason-
able."' The Supreme Court has held that people have a height-
ened expectation of privacy in their homes. 2
Finally, the Supreme Court has established remedies to en-
sure that citizens' Fourth Amendment rights are not violated.
The exclusionary rule is the primary remedy used to protect citi-
zens' Fourth Amendment rights.33 It establishes that, if a search
or arrest is unconstitutional, a defendant may be able to exclude
evidence seized as a result of an illegal search or the search
made as the result of the illegal arrest.34 The exclusionary rule
protects an individual's Fourth Amendment rights because the
evidence suppressed is often key to the arrest and conviction of a
suspect, and it is thought that police will endeavor not to violate
a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights to ensure that the evi-
dence is allowed at trial.35 An illegal arrest does not, however,
void a subsequent lawful conviction. 6 Rather than voiding a con-
viction, the law provides an avenue for civil remedy. A defendant
may sue the arresting police officer(s) for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights in a civil action under 42 USC § 1983."7
31 Id at 361 (Harlan concurring). See also Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 33 (2001)
(stating that "a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable"). But see Minnesota v
Carter, 525 US 83, 92-93 (1998) (Scalia concurring) (arguing that the Katz test is unhelp-
ful but recognizing through historical and common law tradition that the Fourth
Amendment protects individual's homes from unreasonable searches).
32 Katz, 389 US at 361 (Harlan concurring) (stating that "a man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy"). See Kyllo, 533 US at 34, 40 (prohibiting the
use of sense enhancing technology, where not in widespread public use, to search the
interior of the home because it provides information that would not be available other
than through a physical intrusion into the home and reaffirming that the "Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house" and that that line "must not
only be firm but also bright") (citations omitted).
31 Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 391-93 (1914); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655
(1961) (establishing the exclusion of evidence as a deterrent to the police to prevent the
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
34 See, for example, Payton, 445 US at 591-92; United States v Morgan, 743 F2d
1158, 1168 (6th Cir 1984) (excluding evidence found pursuant to an unlawful arrest in a
home). But see New York v Harris, 495 US 14, 17-21 (1990) (declining to extend the
exclusionary rule to statements made at the stationhouse following an improper arrest
that was based on probable cause).
31 Leon, 468 US at 897-98 (1987).
31 Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519, 522 (1952).
37 42 USC § 1983 (2000). See, for example, Hadley v Williams, 368 F3d 747, 748 (7th
Cir 2004) (reversing a grant of summary judgment in a § 1983 action). Although 42 USC §
1983 may offer officers "qualified immunity," the suit does put an officer personally at
risk for liability.
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B. A Warrantless Arrest in Public
The remainder of this Section explores the interplay of these
doctrines and the warrant requirement in specific circumstances:
an arrest in a public place, an arrest in the suspect's home, and
an arrest where the suspect is neither inside nor outside of her
home.
The absence of a warrant does not necessarily make an ar-
rest unconstitutional. In Watson, the Supreme Court established
that the police do not need a warrant to arrest a person in a pub-
lic place if the police have probable cause for the arrest."
In Watson, a postal inspector arrested the defendant in a
public place and obtained his consent to search his car.39 Inside
the car, the inspector found stolen credit cards.4" The defendant
argued that both his arrest and the search were unlawful and
asked the court to exclude the stolen credit cards.4 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the defendant because, although the postal
inspector had time to secure a warrant, he did not.4" The Su-
preme Court reversed and held that a warrantless, public arrest
for a felony based on probable cause is lawful.43
The Court reasoned that its past precedents support the va-
lidity of warrantless public arrests for felonies." The Court also
based its decision on the fact that there is a consistent common
law tradition of warrantless, public felony arrests and that there
38 Watson, 423 US at 418-24. Where a warrant is not needed, the Supreme Court
requires a neutral third-party to make a post-arrest determination that there is probable
cause before the police may detain the suspect for further proceedings. Gerstein v Pugh,
420 US 103, 126 (1975). See also County ofRiverside vMcLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 (1991)
(establishing that the probable cause determination should be made within forty-eight
hours of arrest).
39 Federal statute authorizes postal inspectors to make warrantless felony arrests
based on probable cause. 18 USC § 3061(a)(3) (2000). In Watson, the inspector had prob-
able cause to believe that Watson had stolen credit cards because he received a tip from a
reliable informant that he had used before. Watson, 423 US at 412-13.
40 Id at 412-13.
41 Id at 418-24.
42 United States v Watson, 504 F2d 849, 852 (9th Cir 1974), revd 423 US 411 (1976).
43 Watson, 423 US at 424.
44 Id at 417-23, quoting Carmll v United States, 267 US 132, 156 (1925) ("The usual
rule is that a police officer may arrest without a warrant one believed by the officer upon
probable cause to have been guilty of a felony.") Consider Atwater v City of Lago Vista,
532 US 318, 340 (2001) (upholding a warrantless public arrest for a misdemeanor be-
cause, although there was some disagreement about a "breach of the peace" element in
the common law history, there were "two centuries of uninterrupted (and largely unchal-
lenged) state and federal practice of permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not
amounting to or involving breach of the peace").
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is widespread acceptance of warrantless public arrests.45 The
Court reserved its opinion about whether the police could make a
warrantless arrest in "a private home or other place where the
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy."46
C. Is the Open Threshold of a Home a Public Place?
Shortly after deciding Watson, the Court answered the nar-
row question of whether the open threshold of a home is a public
place in Santana. The Court held that a suspect standing in the
open threshold of her home was in a public place for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis under Watson. 7
In Santana, the police saw the suspect standing in the open
threshold of her home and attempted to arrest her.4 When the
suspect realized what was happening she retreated into her
home.49 The police followed and arrested her inside of her home. °
The Court upheld the arrest because the police had at-
tempted to arrest Santana while she was in a public place-the
open threshold of her home-and when the defendant retreated
into her home it was lawful for the police to follow to make the
arrest because the police were in "hot pursuit."51 The hot pursuit
of suspect was an exigent circumstance that justified the police
officers' warrantless entry of the home and the arrest of the sus-
pect therein. 2
According to the Court, because Santana was standing half
outside of her home, "Is]he was not in an area where she had any
expectation of privacy."53 In fact, Santana "was not merely visible
to the public, she was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing,
and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her
house."54 The Court seemed to establish a public-private distinc-
tion at the threshold of the home. This distinction was based on
the notion of where a person had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. The home is a place usually accorded a heightened privacy
45 Watson, 423 US at 418-23.
46 Id at 432-33 (Powell concurring).
47 Santana, 427 US at 42.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5' Santana, 427 US at 42-43.
52 Id at 43.
53 Id at 42.
54 Id.
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expectation;55 a public place is not.56 Moreover, the Justices
seemed to rely not only on the fact that Santana was in the open
doorway of her home, but also that she voluntarily exposed her-
self to the public prior to the police arriving at her home. The
Court noted that "[wihat a person knowingly exposes to the pu-
bic, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."57
In addition to establishing that a person standing in the
open threshold of a home is sufficiently in a public place for pur-
poses of Watson analysis, the Court acknowledged that, in some
instances, the police may enter a suspect's home and arrest the
suspect inside her home without a warrant. The Court clearly
stated that the police could enter the home in hot pursuit of a
fleeing suspect.58
D. A Warrantless Arrest in the Home
After Santana, it was unclear whether the police could make
a warrantless arrest in the home absent exigent circumstances.
The Court answered this question in Payton; the Court estab-
lished the general proposition that the police cannot make a war-
rantless entry into the home to make a felony arrest.59 It reaf-
firmed the Watson principle that the police could make a war-
rantless arrest in the public but that the line for a public arrest
was the threshold of the home.6"
Payton was based on the consolidation of two cases.6 In the
first case, the police went to a suspect's (Payton's) apartment to
arrest him.62 Although the police did not have either an arrest or
a search warrant, they forcibly entered the home and seized evi-
dence that they found after searching the apartment.6" In the
5' Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan concurring).
56 Id (Harlan concurring).
51 Santana, 427 US at 42, quoting Katz, 389 US at 351. But see Payton, 445 US at
589 ("The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In
none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous
physical dimensions of an individual's home.").
5' Santana, 427 US at 42-43.
59 Id at 590.
6o Id at 585, citing United States v. United States District Court 407 US 297, 313
(1972) (recognizing that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"). See also id at 585-90 (discussing the
importance of the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
61 New York v Payton; New York v tddick, 380 NE2d 224, 225 (NY 1978).
62 Payton, 445 US at 583.
6 Id at 576-77.
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second case, the police knocked on the door of Obie Riddick's
apartment and entered without a warrant after his young son
opened the door.' The police saw Obie Riddick sitting in bed in-
side of the home and they arrested him."5 Before allowing Rid-
dick to open a dresser drawer to get clothes, the police searched
the dresser and seized drugs.66 Both defendants argued that the
warrantless entries of their homes were unconstitutional and
requested the suppression of evidence found therein. + The Su-
preme Court agreed.
In reaching this decision, the Court applied the same ana-
lytic framework that it used in Watson. First, the Court deter-
mined that "the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests
was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places."" Second,
the Court surveyed the status of the law: of the seven circuit
courts to decide the issue, five opined that such arrests were un-
constitutional; three other circuit courts assumed but did not
decide that such arrests were unconstitutional; and, one circuit
court upheld an arrest but did not discuss the issue.69 The Court
noted that, although many states allowed the warrantless entry
of a home, the trend was to limit such practices, and the state
courts that had decided the issue all found the practice unlawful,
except for Florida and New York.7"
Additionally, the Court's decision was based, in part, on the
concept that the home affords a person heightened privacy pro-
tection.7 ' The Court noted that no exigent circumstances existed
in Payton.72 Also, the cases were distinguished from Santana be-
cause neither Riddick nor Payton had voluntarily put himself in
a public space. Consent was not an issue either; although Rid-
dick's door was opened to the police, the Court could not infer
that Riddick consented to the police entry because his three year
old son had opened the door.7
64 Id at 578.
65 Id.
66 Payton, 445 US at 578.
67 Id at 574-75.
68 Id at 596.
69 Id at 575 n 4.
70 Payton, 445 US at 599-60.
71 Id at 586-87.
72 Id at 583 ("[W]e have no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous
situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a war-
rantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.").
73 Id.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun suggested a dif-
ferent frame of analysis that may shed light on the circuit split
at issue in this Comment. Instead of relying on historical analy-
sis of the common law, Blackmun sought to balance the govern-
ment's interests with individuals' interests, with the sanctity of
the home tipping the balance in favor of requiring a warrant ab-
sent exigent circumstances.74 This balancing approach did not
establish a bright-line rule, as the majority's decision seemed to
create. Rather, it suggested that the heightened privacy protec-
tion of the home barred warrantless arrests in the home.75 The
opinion recognized that there may be some instances where the
heightened privacy protection of the home yields to heightened
state interests, such as when there are exigent circumstances.
In his dissent, Justice White also rejected a bright-line rule
that prohibited warrantless felony arrests in the home.76 Justice
White suggested that the analysis should focus on the extent of
the intrusiveness of the police activity." Accordingly, that analy-
sis would show that the warrantless entries at issue in Payton
were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.8
What the concurring and dissenting opinions reveal is that
even if Payton established a bright-line rule protecting the home,
in certain cases, this rule must cede to other interests. These
opinions question whether the holding in Payton should be con-
strued narrowly and should only prohibit certain physical intru-
sions into the home without a warrant.
After Payton, it seemed clear that the police could only enter
a suspect's home to arrest him if they had a warrant or if the po-
lice had probable cause and there were exigent circumstances
that justified entry of the home. Yet, the scope and definition of
exigent circumstances is unclear. Additionally, the idea that a
suspect could consent to the police activity remains unaddressed
by the Court. Finally, it is unclear whether someone inside of his
74 Payton, 445 US at 603 (Blackmun concurring). In his analysis, Blackmun noted
that Watson was likewise justified on a balancing of the interests approach. Id. The bal-
ancing of the interests approach is similar to the analytical approach that the Court
adopted in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 (1968) (affirming petitioner's conviction for carry-
ing a concealed weapon when the police found the weapon through a warrantless "stop
and frisk" by balancing the need to search a suspect against the invasion that the search
entailed).
75 Id at 603 (Blackmun concurring) (stating that "[tihe suspect's interest in the sanc-
tity of his home then outweighs the governmental interests").
76 Id at 603-04 (White dissenting).
77 Id at 615-17 (White dissenting).
78 Payton, 445 US at 615-16 (White dissenting).
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home can still expose himself to the public such that he is subject
to a warrantless arrest in accordance with Santana. Since 1980,
the Court has not clarified whether Payton should be considered
a bright-line rule.79 It has only restated its general principle in
dicta.8" In the meantime, courts have struggled with the parame-
ters of Payton.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuit courts have interpreted the requirements of
Payton1 differently. Some circuit courts have held that the po-
lice, with probable cause, may arrest a suspect who is inside his
home if he is exposed to the public through an open door. This
Section explores a case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v
Vaneaton,s2 and a case from the Second Circuit, United States v
Gofi.8
3
Other circuit courts have rejected this approach. These
courts have reasoned that someone inside of his home does not
necessarily voluntarily expose himself to arrest by having the
door to his home opened to the police or to the public. This Sec-
tion analyzes two such cases, one from the Sixth Circuit, United
States v Morgan,s' and one from the Seventh Circuit, Hadley v
United States.
85
A. A Plain View or Voluntary Exposure Exception to Payton
As noted above, some courts have held that when a suspect
or someone in the home voluntarily opens the door to the police
or to the public, the police may arrest the suspect inside of the
home without a warrant. This may be considered a consent ex-
ception to Payton.6 If a suspect voluntarily interacts with the
79 Consider Groh v Ramirez, 540 US 551, 565, 559 (2004) ("No reasonable officer
could claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that, absent
consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitu-
tional.") (emphasis added).
80 Krk v Louisiana, 536 US 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) ("[Plolice officers need ei-
ther a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful
entry into a home.").
81 445 US 573 (1980).
82 49 F3d 1423 (9th Cir 1995).
83 230 F3d 44 (2d Cir 2000).
84 743 F2d 1158 (6th Cir 1984).
85 368 F3d 747 (7th Cir 2004).
86 The Court has not resolved the consent exception to the prohibition against war-
rantless arrests. See Payton, 445 US at 583 (stating the consent was not an issue in the
case because Obie Riddick's young son opened the door to the police). Nevertheless, some
569] 579
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police, the home does not afford that suspect additional protec-
tion. This approach may also be considered an extension of
Santana,"7 where a suspect places himself in the 'public' arena
because, though he remains inside of the home, the suspect is
viewable by the public and the police. On the other hand, these
may be considered cases where Payton does not apply simply
because the police never physically enter the home.
In Vaneaton,s the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the war-
rantless arrest of a suspect inside his hotel room, and denied the
suppression of evidence found in connection with the arrest. 9 In
this case, the police discovered that a suspect wanted for several
robberies was staying in a hotel that the police had visited as
part of an investigation." The police went to the suspect's room,
and with their guns holstered, knocked on the door.9 The sus-
pect, Vaneaton, saw the police through a window and opened the
door to them, at which point the police arrested him inside his
hotel room.92 Vaneaton then consented to a search of his hotel
room during which the police found a weapon.9
The Ninth Circuit held that this arrest did not violate
Payton and that the evidence found pursuant to the search,
based on the suspect's consent, was valid. 4 The court reasoned
that because Vaneaton "so expose[d] himself, the presumption of
Payton was overcome,"95 the presumption being that the home, or
hotel room, provides heightened privacy protection. According to
courts have found that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. See, for ex-
ample, United States v Samet, 794 F Supp 178, 181-82 (E D Va 1992) (upholding a war-
rantless arrest, based on "consent once removed," where the defendant had invited an
undercover police officer into his home and other officers entered the home upon receiving
a signal from the undercover officer); United States v Diaz, 814 F2d 454, 459 (7th Cir
1987), cert denied 484 US 657 (1987) (same).
87 427 US at 42.
8s 49 F3d 1423 (9th Cir 1995).
89 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1425 (holding that the "police, acting with probable cause but
without a warrant while standing outside [a] motel room, could lawfully arrest [a person]
while he was standing immediately inside the open doorway"). The Payton prohibition
against warrantless arrests absent exigent circumstances is applicable to hotel rooms or
guest quarters at commercial establishments. See United States v Baldacchino, 762 F2d
170, 175-76 (1st Cir 1985) (stating that the guest of an inn has the same right of privacy
in his hotel room as a person has in his home); United States v Newbern, 731 F2d 744,
748 (11th Cir 1984) (same); United States v Jones, 696 F2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir 1982)
cert denied 462 US 1106 (1983) (same).
90 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1425.
91 Id.
92 Id at 1427.
93 Id at 1425.
94 Vareaton, 49 F3d at 1427.
95 Id at 1426.
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the court, the Vaneaton "episode d[id] not materially resemble
the kinds of 'invasions' or 'intrusions' against which Payton
[sought] to guard."96 Therefore, the court determined that the
appropriate test was "not whether [the defendant] was standing
inside or outside of the threshold ... but whether he voluntarily
exposed himself to warrantless arrest by freely opening the door
of his hotel room."97
In other words, the court framed the issue not as whether
Vaneaton was sufficiently in a public place when he stood in the
open threshold of his hotel room to justify a warrantless arrest,
like in Santana.9" Rather, the court framed the question as
whether he voluntarily exposed himself to the police when he
opened the door. According to the court, the police did not coerce
or use force to get Vaneaton to open the door to them.99
One judge disagreed with this reasoning and dissented.
Judge Tashima highlighted the potentially problematic policy
implications of the voluntary exposure rationale. He noted that
the majority approach could discourage people from opening the
doors to the police, which would have an adverse effect on police
officers' jobs.' 0 His dissent illustrates that the voluntary expo-
sure or plain view analysis creates a line drawing problem. A
"voluntary exposure" exception would introduce confusion over
"whether appearing at a closed screen door, or a glass door, or
even an open window is sufficient to trigger the voluntary expo-
sure exception."' The courts would have to "decide how far in-
side the home and away from the doorway a citizen must be to
escape the voluntary exposure exception."
10 2
In one case that illustrates these problems, the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the warrantless arrest of a suspect who was inside of
an apartment when the police seized him."0 3 In Gori, the police
entered an apartment building and set up surveillance of an
apartment that was supposed to be a drug trafficking locale.0 4
The police sat in surveillance for twenty to thirty minutes when
a food delivery person arrived and knocked on the apartment
96 Id at 1427.
97 Id at 1426 (internal quotes omitted).
98 427 US 38, 42 (1976).
99 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1427.
1oo Id at 1430 (Tashima dissenting).
'01 Id at 1430 n 9 (Tashima dissenting).
102 Id (Tashima dissenting).
103 United States v Gori, 230 F3d 44, 57 (2d Cir 2000).
104 Id at 47.
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door. l°5 When the occupants of the apartment opened the door to
the food delivery person, the officers-with their weapons drawn
but pointed at the ground-asked everyone to leave the apart-
ment and enter the public hallway. °6 At that point the officers
arrested the occupants; the owner of the apartment then gave
consent to search the apartment. 0 7 The occupants of the apart-
ment argued that their arrests were unlawful and the evidence
seized thereafter should be suppressed.' 8
The court held that the arrest was lawful and denied the
suppression of evidence.10 9 The court reasoned that Payton was
not implicated in the case."0 Because the police did not physi-
cally enter the home-the "evil" that the Fourth Amendment and
the Payton decision guard against--"the warrant requirement
and the heightened protections established for the home in
Payton [we]re not implicated.""' The court stated that people
who "voluntarily expose themselves to public view... [have] no
reasonable expectation of privacy" and could be subject to a war-
rantless arrest at their home "in absence of unreasonable police
conduct."" 2
In sum, the Second Circuit based its decision on three fac-
tors. First, the court understood Payton to be a prohibition
against the police physically entering a home without a warrant.
Second, the occupants exposed themselves to the public, and
thereby to a public warrantless arrest, when one of the occupants
of the apartment opened the door to the food delivery person.
Persons so exposed to the public, even while within the home, did
not enjoy a heightened or reasonable expectation of privacy.
Third, the court did not consider consent an issue; it did not re-
quire the occupants to consent to the door being opened to the
public or a showing that it was the owner of the home that volun-
tarily opened the door to the food delivery person.
The dissent in the case suggested that the court was miscon-
struing the doctrinal issues. According to the dissent, the Su-
preme Court had "made clear that individuals do not forfeit all
106 Id.
106 Id at 47.
107 Gof, 230 F3d at 47.
108 Id at 48.
109 Id at 57.
"0 Id at 53.
"' Gorfi 230 F3d at 53.
112 Id at 46, 54, quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19 (1968).
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privacy rights simply by placing themselves in public view."' 3
Further, regardless of how minimal the search of or the seizure
in a home may be, such acts invade the "sanctity of the home"
and must be based on probable cause, not mere reasonable-
ness." 4 Finally, the dissent asserted that there was no policy
reason to abandon the warrant requirement, because the police
could use what they heard or saw through an open doorway to
"form the probable cause basis for a warrant or lead them to de-
termine that there were exigent circumstances excusing a war-
rant.""
5
Both Vaneaton and Gori illustrate the struggle to interpret
Payton. The majority opinions start with the assumption that
Payton was about preventing the warrantless physical entry of
the home. Both decisions are based on voluntary exposure to the
public or voluntary exposure to the police reasoning, and both
use reasonableness analysis to determine that the police actions
at issue were legal. The dissents in both cases raise similar pol-
icy concerns, which need to be addressed when formulating a
solution to the circuit split. It is notable that both dissents re-
semble Judge Posner's majority opinion in Hadley as discussed
below.
B. Rejecting the Plain View, Voluntary Exposure Exception
This Section of the Comment analyzes two cases that reject a
voluntary exposure exception to Payton. These decisions are no-
table for their understanding of Payton as embracing a more ex-
pansive prohibition against arrests in the home, without a war-
rant and in the absence of exigent circumstances; the decisions
do not reject the Payton framework insofar as they involve in-
stances where the police did not physically enter the suspects'
homes. Additionally, the decisions illustrate the line drawing
problem of a voluntary exposure exception to Payton. They rea-
son that Payton does not unnecessarily limit police activity be-
cause the police can use any knowledge they gain from what they
see in plain sight to get a warrant or to determine that there are
113 Id at 58 (Sotomayor dissenting).
114 Id at 64-65, citing Justice Scalia's decision in Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321, 328
(1987) (Sotomayor dissenting) ("[A] dwelling-place search, no less than a dwelling-place
seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why
application of the 'plain view doctrine' would supplant that requirement.").
'15 Gori, 230 F3d at 59 (Sotomayor dissenting).
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exigent circumstances which allow a warrantless arrest in the
home.
In Morgan, the Sixth Circuit Court rejected a voluntary ex-
posure exception to Payton."' The court held that absent a war-
rant or exigent circumstances-which it listed as hot pursuit, an
emergency situation, an immediate threat to officers or the pub-
lic, or the threat of the destruction of evidence, or the threat of
escape-the police cannot use coercive tactics to compel a suspect
to leave his home.
1 7
In Morgan, the police saw the defendant put weapons into
his car after responding to complaints about someone discharg-
ing weapons in a public park."' Several hours later, the police
surrounded the defendant's home without a warrant."9 The po-
lice focused floodlights on the home and used a bullhorn to com-
mand Morgan to exit. 2 ° The defendant appeared at the front
door with a pistol in his hand, which he subsequently put down
inside the doorway before exiting the house.12" ' The police
searched the entire home and found additional guns, but only the
gun that was left inside of the front door was held unlawful.'22
Morgan argued that the arrest was unconstitutional and that the
evidence found subsequent to the arrest should be suppressed.'23
The court agreed. It rejected the state's justification that the
arrest was lawful because the police could see him in plain view
when he was at the open door of the home and the court rejected
the plain view justification for the seizure of evidence incident to
arrest.124
The court rejected the state's use of a balancing of the inter-
ests analysis to justify the seizure of Morgan. 25 Instead, the
court stated that the proper frame of analysis was Payton.126 Ac-
cordingly, the presumption was that police could not make a
116 Id at 1166-67, citing United States v McCoo, 526 F Supp 1206, 1209 (M D Tenn
1981) ("To uphold a warrantless arrest at a person's home whenever law enforcement
officers successfully obtain his presence at a door too readily allows subversion of the
Payton principle.").
117 Morgan, 743 F2d at 1163.
118 Id at 1160.
119 Id at 1160-61.
120 Id at 1161.
121 Morgan, 743 F2d at 1161.
122 The gun violated a statutory firearms provision. Id.
123 Id.
124 Id at 1167-68.
125 Morgan, 743 F2d at 1166-68.
126 Id.
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warrantless arrest inside of the suspect's home, absent exigent
circumstances. The court recognized that police activity may be
so coercive that it becomes a constructive intrusion into the home
which violates Pajyton.'27 From this perspective, the police do not
have to physically enter or invade the home to achieve the same
results as an unlawful entry. 2 ' Morgan had not voluntarily ap-
peared at his front door or voluntarily exited his home. Instead,
he was compelled to do so by the police activity. Additionally, the
court reasoned that the police did not have a lawful right to be in
the home and, therefore, did not have a lawful basis to see the
evidence in question.'29 Because the police were not lawfully
searching the home, the evidence they saw and seized, even
though in plain sight, was excluded.
Similarly, in Hadley, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected a
plain view exception to Payton in a § 1983 suit for damages.8 °
When the police knocked at the home where Hadley lived, his
sister opened the door.' 3' The police saw Hadley in his bedroom
through the open door and they arrested him.132 The court held
that a grant of summary judgment in the § 1983 suit was incon-
sistent with the principle that "to arrest a person in his home
without a warrant is normally a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment even if there is probable cause to arrest him."3 3
The court explained that consent was not a valid basis for
the police entry because it was not clear whether the sister al-
lowed the police into the home.134 When a person answers a
knock on his door, it does not mean that he is welcoming the per-
son who knocked to enter his home. 35
The court explicitly rejected the reasoning that the police
can arrest someone who is in the plain view of the police even
when he remains inside of his home. The court stated that be-
cause "few people will refuse to open the door to the police, the
effect of the rule in Gori and Vaneaton is to undermine ... the
principle that a warrant is required for entry into the home, in
127 Id.
128 Id at 1167.
129 Morgan, 743 F2d at 1167.
130 368 F3d at 750.
131 Id.
132 Id at 749.
133 Id.
134 Hadley, 368 F3d at 750.
135 Id.
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absence of consent or compelling circumstances."136 Allowing the
police to seize anything that they see through an open doorway is
"inconsistent with the spirit of Payton."
137
The court reasoned that its holding would not tie police offi-
cers' hands because knowledge that they obtained from what was
in "plain view" in the open doorway could serve as the basis for a
warrant. 8' Further, if the "police reasonably fear that before
they can obtain a warrant the contraband or evidence will be de-
stroyed or the criminal flee the nest" then "the case becomes one
of 'exigent circumstances' and the police can take steps to secure
the evidence or the person."139
This reasoning closely resembles the dissents in Vaneaton
and Gon. And the Seventh Circuit's understanding of Payton-
as a prohibition of arrest in the home absent a warrant, not just
a prohibition against the physical entry of the home without a
warrant-is similar to the Sixth Circuit Court's approach in
Morgan. As noted above, Morgan and Hadley represent a funda-
mentally different understanding of Payton from the decisions in
Vaneaton and Gori.
Circuit courts wrestle with cases where the police do not
cross the physical threshold of the home to seize and arrest a
person while he is inside of his home. It remains unclear whether
the Payton rule is about prohibiting the police from physically
entering a home without a warrant, consent, or exigent circum-
stances. The circuit courts disagree over whether a suspect can
voluntarily expose himself to the police or to the public such that
a warrantless arrest in the home becomes legal. The courts also
disagree over what constitutes voluntary exposure. Finally,
courts disagree about whether Payton establishes a bright-line
rule or if the courts should balance the privacy protection of the
home with the degree of the intrusiveness of the police action.
III. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
When the Supreme Court decided Payton, it settled certain
aspects of the law surrounding warrantless arrests.14 The police
136 Id.
137 Id at 749.
138 Hadley, 368 F3d at 749.
139 Id at 750, citing Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740, 749-50 (1984), United States v
Santana, 427 US 38, 42-43 (1976).
140 Payton, 445 US at 573.
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may make a warrantless, public arrest.'4 ' Additionally, a person
who is standing in the open threshold of her home is considered
to be in a public place if the police see her there when they ap-
proach and attempt to arrest her.4 But the police may not
physically enter a private home to make an arrest, even when
they have probable cause, unless they have a warrant or there
are exigent circumstances.
43
Nonetheless, the Court left other areas of the law uncertain.
It is not clear whether Payton applies to situations where the
police do not physically enter the home to arrest a suspect. The
first issue this Section clarifies is whether Payton applies to
situations where the police do not physically enter a home to
make an arrest. This Section suggests that the application of
Payton to situations where the police do not physically enter the
home is a narrow prohibition.
Another area of uncertainty is whether a suspect consents to
a warrantless arrest in his home when he voluntarily exposes
himself to public view or to the police while he remains inside of
his home. The Supreme Court suggested that there may be situa-
tions when a suspect consents to a warrantless in-home arrest,'"
but the Court has not elaborated on this Payton exception. 145 The
second issue this Section addresses is how a suspect can give his
consent to a warrantless arrest in his home-the voluntary expo-
sure doctrine. This is a key point of departure in the circuits.
This Section discusses the policy implications of the voluntary
exposure doctrine and whether it abrogates Payton.
Third, this Section analyzes whether Payton establishes a
bright-line rule. The Comment suggests that it does not; rather,
Payton creates the presumption that any warrantless arrest in
the home is unlawful, except when there is consent or exigent
circumstances. The courts should not adopt a interests-balancing
approach and only consider if the police activity is reasonable. A
141 Watson, 423 US at 411.
142 Santana, 427 US at 43.
143 Payton, 445 US at 587-88.
144 See id at 583; Grob v Ramirez, 540 US at 560 (noting that a search of private prop-
erty is unreasonable unless there is a search warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances).
145 Some courts have applied the consent exception to Payton in different situations.
See, for example, United States v Samet, 794 F Supp 178, 181-82 (E D Va 1992) (uphold-
ing a warrantless arrest, based on "consent once removed," where the defendant had
invited an undercover police officer into his home and other officers entered the home
upon receiving a signal from the undercover officer); United States v Diaz, 814 F2d 454,
459 (7th Cir 1987) (same).
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warrantless arrest in the home, absent consent or exigent cir-
cumstances, should be held presumptively unreasonable.
A. The Police Do Not Physically Enter the Home to Make an In-
Home, Warrantless Arrest
The Ninth Circuit in Vaneaton and the Second Circuit in
Gori concluded that Payton does not apply when the police do not
physically enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest.
The court in Vaneaton tried to avoid a discussion that centered
on where the suspect stood in relation to the threshold of the
home because it created a line drawing problem.'46 Yet, an ap-
proach that focuses only on the location of the police officer may
involve the court in a similar line drawing problem.
The Vaneaton and Goi approach is based on an understand-
ing that the Fourth Amendment and the Payton decision were
designed to prevent or protect against certain kinds of govern-
ment intrusions into a private place. 47 But the only support for
this approach in Payton stems from Justice White's dissent. The
Supreme Court recently suggested that Payton prohibits the
physical intrusion of the home. This suggestion, however, was
included only in dicta in another opinion by Justice White. 4
As illustrated in the circuit court cases involved in the cir-
cuit split, this interpretation of Payton allows the police to arrest
a suspect in his home if the police action was reasonable in se-
curing the suspect in a publicly viewable location within the
home. This means that as long as the police do not cross the
threshold, the only question for the court to decide is whether the
police acted reasonably. 4
9
The Gori court posits that the proper frame of analysis for
determining whether police activity is reasonable in these situa-
tions is Terry v Ohio.5 ° This implies that, even if he is inside his
home, a suspect can be treated as if he were on a public street, as
long as the police can see him from outside of the home. It follows
that if the Payton prohibition does not bar warrantless arrests in
146 Vaneaton, 49 F3d 1425-26.
147 See id at 1427 (reasoning that Payton prohibits police from making a warrantless
physical entry of the home to make an arrest); Gori, 230 F3d at 51 (same).
148 Payton, 445 US at 619. (White dissenting). See also New York vHarris, 495 US 14,
16 (1990) (asserting that Payton prohibits police from entering the home to make a war-
rantless arrest).
149 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1427; Goi, 230 F3d at 51.
150 Goz, 230 F3d at 54.
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the home, even where the police do not enter the home, the police
could easily overcome Payton.15'
Still, the Payton holding does not necessarily limit the pro-
hibition against warrantless in-home arrests to situations where
the police physically enter the home.'52 As the decisions in Mor-
gan and Hadley show, some circuit courts do not understand
Payton to only prohibit the police from physically entering the
home. Instead, these courts look to whether the suspect was ar-
rested without a warrant while inside of his home.
If Payton did prohibit the in-home arrest of a suspect-
absent a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances-the results
in the cases discussed in this Comment would not necessarily
change, as discussed below. These exceptions narrow the Payton
holding. Importantly, courts recognize that the police are dealing
with fluid situations. 153 It may be true that exigent circum-
stances are likely to arise where the police attempt to arrest
someone.'54 But, when these exigent circumstances develop the
police can arrest a suspect in his home without a warrant. 55
Additionally, the police may use knowledge that they obtain
in their investigation, surveillance, or plain view observation of
the suspect and his home to determine that exigent circum-
stances exist or to form the basis of probable cause for a war-
rant."' 6 Finally, the police can ask the suspect to consent to their
entry of his home; they can also ask the suspect to exit his home.
Consent can overcome the prohibition against a warrantless ar-
rest in the home.'57 Therefore, applying Payton to situations
where the police do not physically breach the threshold does not
necessarily tie the hands of police officers.
Moreover, even when an arrest is found to be illegal because
of a Payton violation, the conviction is not necessarily void. 5 '
Further, an illegal arrest does not necessarily lead to the sup-
151 Consider Hadley, 368 F3d at 750 (noting that "equat[ing] knowledge (what the
officer obtains from the plain view) with a right to enter" would "permit the rule of Payton
to be evaded").
152 Payton, 445 US at 583.
153 Sharpe, 470 US at 686.
154 Payton, 445 US at 619 (White dissenting) (claiming that "arrests recurringly in-
volve exigent circumstances, and this Court has heretofore held that a warrant can be
dispensed with without undue sacrifice in Fourth Amendment values").
155 See, for example, Santana, 427 US at 42-43 (finding that a fleeing suspect created
exigent circumstances which justified an in-home warrantless arrest).
156 Hadley, 368 F3d at 750, citing Welsh, 466 US at 749-50, Santana, 427 US at 42-
43; Gori, 230 F3d at 59 (Sotomayor dissenting).
157 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1426.
158 Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519, 522 (1952).
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pression of all of the evidence found following that arrest. 15 9 Evi-
dence secured subsequent to the arrest may not be excluded from
trial if the arrest was based on probable cause. 160 In sum, an in-
terpretation of Payton that prohibits in-home arrests-absent a
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances--does not create a
broad rule that will prevent the police from doing their jobs or
suspects from being convicted of crimes.
B. Consenting to a Warrantless In-Home Arrest: Should there
be a Voluntary Exposure Exception to Payton?
There should not be a voluntary exposure exception to
Payton. The exception would create a line drawing problem for
courts. It would create unclear guidelines for police officers. The
voluntary exposure exception also creates bad incentives for the
police. This Section explores reasons why the exception is not
necessary. It also discusses reasons why the voluntary exposure
exception is problematic.
If a suspect invites a police officer into his home, he has lim-
ited his personal expectation of privacy. It would be reasonable to
conclude that at that point the home does not afford the suspect
additional protection from a warrantless arrest. Similarly, if a
suspect voluntarily leaves his home he exposes himself to war-
rantless arrest by entering a public place.161
It could be argued that people feel like they have no choice
but to allow the police to enter their homes when asked. Like-
wise, people may not feel free to remain inside of their homes
when the police request that they step into a public area. This
argument raises the question of whether these situations are
coercive.
The courts have dealt with the question of coercion in other
contexts. 162 Looking to the consent to search doctrine,"6 a rea-
sonable rule in this context would be whether, given the totality
of the circumstances, the suspect consented to either the police
159 Haris, 495 US at 17-21 (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to statements
made at the stationhouse following an improper arrest that was based on probable cause).
160 Id.
161 Santana, 427 US at 42. See also Watson, 423 US at 423-24 (establishing the con-
stitutionality of warrantless public arrests that are based on probable cause).
162 See, for example, Bumper vNorth Carolina, 391 US 543, 548 (1968) (holding that a
search cannot be justified by consent when the suspect consented only after a police offi-
cer told the suspect that he had a warrant to search).
163 Consider Scneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 227 (1973) (establishing that to
determine whether consent to search is given voluntarily the court should consider the
totality of the circumstances).
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entering his home or to his exiting his home. For example, in
Vaneaton the court could have concluded that Payton did apply
but that arrest was legal because the suspect consented to the
police action when he opened his hotel door knowing it was the
police knocking on the door.'64 The police did not act in a coercive
manner in the encounter and the suspect consented to the police
search of his hotel room.165
On the other hand, in Morgan, the police clearly acted coer-
cively in securing the suspect's presence outside of his home. 66
The suspect reasonably feared that he was under siege because
the police had his home surrounded.'67 A suspect who leaves his
home under these circumstances is not consenting to his war-
rantless arrest or to the police entry of his home. The police tac:
tics created a situation where Morgan was not free to go about
his business or remain in his home.
168
As illustrated in Vaneaton, in order to consent to police ac-
tivity the suspect must know that it is the police knocking at his
door. A person does not voluntarily consent to a warrantless ar-
rest in his home where he is unaware that the police are knock-
ing at his door. 169 Though some may argue that knowing that it is
the police knocking on the door is not required,' that reasoning
undercuts the voluntary consent doctrine in this instance. The
suspect must knowingly put himself in a public place or reveal
himself to the police.
In this way, Gon presents a consent problem. The police
used a coercive tactic to get the occupants of the apartment to
expose themselves to the public and the police. They used a
third-party as a straw man to get the occupants of the apartment
to open their door. 7' The occupants did not knowingly expose
164 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1425.
165 Id.
166 Morgan, 743 F2d at 1161, 1164.
167 Id at 1161.
168 Id at 1164, citing Florida vRoyer, 460 US 491, 303 (1983) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that someone is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes if the suspect is not free to
leave).
169 Consider Hadley, 368 F3d at 750 ("[Tlhe fact that a person answers a knock at the
door doesn't mean that he agrees to let the person who knocked enter.").
170 See Bustamonte, 412 US at 241 ("There is a vast difference between those rights
that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of
trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to
be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.").
171 Gori, 230 F3d at 47.
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themselves to the police. They did not give their consent to the
police activity. Persons inside of the home-even if in plain sight
of the police through an open door-are not necessarily giving
their consent to the police.' 2 Using a third party in this way does
not yield voluntary access to the suspects. Thus, for policy rea-
sons, relying on third parties as a tactic to secure access to the
interior of a home and the occupants therein should be discour-
aged. It creates an exigent situation by placing a third party in
danger.
Still, there may be a way to justify the arrest of the occu-
pants of the apartment in Gori. Even though the police used co-
ercive tactics-or tactics that should be discouraged on policy
grounds-to gain access to the apartment, the owner of the home
gave her consent to the police to search the home.'73 It is reason-
able to conclude that the owner's consent to the search'74 could be
the basis for the warrantless arrest of the occupants of the
apartment. The occupants did not have an expectation of privacy
in the apartment when the owner gave her consent to the search
and the police had probable cause for the arrest of the occu-
pants.1 5
Instead of adopting this consent approach the courts in Gori
and Vaneaton adopted voluntary exposure reasoning. Because
the police could see the suspects, the warrantless arrests were
lawful. The Supreme Court has not yet applied its plain view
doctrine to people and it is unclear whether the Santana reason-
ing would apply to people who are inside of their homes but ex-
posed to the public through an open door. The Supreme Court
seemed to reject this reasoning in Payton when it did not uphold
the arrest of Obie Riddick when an opened door exposed Riddick
to the police. 1
6
Extending this reasoning to the interior of the home creates
a line drawing problem as illustrated in the dissents in Vaneaton
172 Payton, 445 US at 583.
173 Goriz 230 F3d at 47.
174 Bustamonte, 412 US at 227. See also Illinois v Rodr'guez, 497 US 177, 184-86
(1990) (holding that a warrantless search of a home is valid based on third party consent
if it is objectively reasonable for the police to believe that the third party could have con-
sented to the search); United States v Matlock, 415 US 164, 170-71 (1974) (establishing
that a warrantless search is valid when based on consent of a third party who has com-
mon authority over the premises).
175 Steagald v United States, 451 US 204, 205-06 (1981) (holding that, absent exigent
circumstances or consent, the police need a search warrant to arrest someone in the home
of a third party).
176 Payton, 445 US at 583.
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and Goz, and in the Hadley opinion.1 77 This problem does not
just involve the courts. The rule would also create confusion for
police officers who would have to judge-in often difficult and
fluid situations-when a suspect was sufficiently exposed to the
public to justify the arrest. It will create confusion about whether
the home still affords a heightened privacy protection. This
would likely have ramifications for the warrantless search doc-
trine.
It could be argued that the consent exception and the exi-
gent circumstances exception to Payton also create line drawing
problems. However, the police and the courts already have a ba-
sis for judging these situations. The police and the courts can
draw on the consent to search doctrine. The exigent circum-
stances exception is specifically designed to give the police the
benefit of the doubt-and prevent line drawing problems-where
the police believe that they or a third party are in danger, where
the suspect may destroy evidence, or where the suspect may try
to flee.17
The voluntary exposure doctrine, on the other hand, does not
fit with the plain view doctrine-used to expand the things the
police may seize when they are lawfully searchingl' 9-because in
the warrantless arrest situations the police are not necessarily
already lawfully searching. The lawfulness of the police activity
is at issue.
Finally, the voluntary exposure doctrine creates odd incen-
tives. People may be reluctant to open their doors to the police, or
to the public, and this can negatively impact the police who often
rely on the public for information relating to specific crimes."8 0 It
may also create an atmosphere of paranoia because people will
not feel secure in their homes and this in turn may create more
dangerous situations for the police.
The voluntary exposure exception can eliminate much of the
heightened privacy protection of the home. Such a change in
177 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1430 (Tashima dissenting); Gorz 230 F3d at 58 (Sotomayor
dissenting); Hadley, 368 F3d at 750.
178 See Welsh, 466 US at 749-50 (establishing that the threat of evidence destruction
is an exigent circumstance); Santana, 427 US at 42 (holding that a fleeing suspect creates
an exigent circumstance); Warden v Hayden, 387 US at 298 (finding that danger to the
police or third parties is an exigent circumstance).
179 See Coolidge, 403 US at 465; Horton, 496 US at 130 (establishing that when the
police are searching pursuant to a search warrant they may seize evidence not specifically
listed in the warrant if the evidence is in their plain view and if it is apparent that the
object is connected to a crime or if it is contraband).
180 Vaneaton, 49 F3d at 1430 (Tashima dissenting).
593569]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
Fourth Amendment doctrine should come from the Supreme
Court. There is textual basis for protection of the home, l81 there
is common law tradition to support the protection of the home, 8 2
and there is Supreme Court precedent protecting the privacy of
the home.8 3 For these reasons, voluntary exposure should not be
considered as an exception to Payton.
C. How Courts Should Apply Payton to Warrantless Arrests in
the Home Where the Police do not Physically Enter the
Home
Until the Supreme Court offers clarification, the circuit
courts should apply heightened Payton protection in cases where
the police arrest a person in his home without a warrant, even if
the police do not physically enter the home. This presumption,
that a warrantless in-home arrest is illegal, can be overcome
where there are exigent circumstances or where the suspect con-
sents to the police presence in his home or the suspect voluntar-
ily leaves his home."M
As indicated, Payton does not establish a bright-line rule
under this formulation. Rather, it establishes a presumption that
can be overcome in specific situations. The state can overcome
the presumption by showing that there were exigent circum-
stances, or that the suspect consented to the police activity, or
that the suspect voluntarily left his home.
CONCLUSION
This Comment attempts to reconcile the circuit court split
over the application of Payton to warrantless arrests of suspects
in the home where the police do not physically enter the home. It
resolves the question of whether voluntary exposure is an excep-
181 US Const Amend IV.
182 Payton, 445 US at 584-86.
183 See, for example, Kyllo, 533 US at 40 (reaffirming that the "Fourth Amendment
draws a firm line at the entrance of the house" and that that line "must not only be firm
but also bright").
184 The state should have the burden of proof in establishing either of these situations.
As courts have established, the burden of proof should be by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. See, for example, United States v Halley, 841 F Supp 137, 139 (M D Pa 1993)
(declaring that the state must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its entry
into [a] defendant's apartment was justified by such circumstances"; United States v
Samet, 794 F Supp 178, 180 (E D Va 1992) ("Warrants are not required in cases in which
the prosecution can prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry.").
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tion to the prohibition against warrantless in-home arrests. The
Comment argues that Payton did not establish a bright-line rule.
Rather, it is a narrow presumption that a warrantless arrest in
the home is unlawful in the absence of either consent or exigent
circumstances.

